Eastern Europe (CEE), about which there is little genuinely comparative research.
Having conceptualized the CEE centre-right and tracked its development in parallel national cases in a previously published collection (Szczerbiak and Hanley 2006) , in this paper we consider in more directly comparative terms why some centre-right parties in this region have been more successful than others. We do so by comparing three CEE countries in the period 1990-2006 where the centre-right enjoyed contrasting fortunes: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. We focus on these cases because, since the fall of communism in 1989, they have experienced clear and relatively well-established programmatic competition and offer a degree of variance.
We define our dependent variable of centre-right 'success' in terms of centre-right formations' breadth and durability. We pay particular attention to three of the major centre-right formations in these countries in this period: Hungary's Fidesz, the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) in Poland. In comparing these three cases, we seek not only to examine the comparative development of a hitherto neglected set of parties, but also to test and expand approaches to party development in CEE more generally.
The paper begins by explaining why we believe that broad and durable party formations are 'successful' outcomes. In section two, we operationalise party breadth and durability and rank Hungary and the Czech Republic as the more successful cases and Poland as least successful. We then examine critically possible explanations for these patterns of variation in the existing literatures, specifically: (i) macroinstitutional explanations that focus on executive structures and electoral systems; (ii) historical-structural ones that focus on regime legacies; and (iii) path dependent/critical juncture frameworks that focus on choices made in the course of transition politics. We then posit two supplementary explanations for centre-right 'success': (a) the presence of cohesive leadership elites able to act as the nucleus of new centre-right formations and (b) the ability of such elites to craft broad integrative narratives that can transcend diverse ideological positions and unite broad swathes of centre-right activists and voters. We conclude with a short discussion of the broader applicability of this framework and the implications of recent developments in Poland and other states in the region.
Why broad and durable party formations?
The concept of 'party success' is a problematic one. It is conventionally thought of as a combination of office-holding, political longevity, vote maximisation and the implementation of policy goals (Kitschelt 1989 (Kitschelt , 1994 Muller and Strom 1999) .
However, for the purposes of this paper we reject office-holding and policy-or performance-based measures of success. Policy outcomes are determined by a complex array of economic, political, social and institutional factors. As such they are too multi-form to link to incumbent parties. This is particularly true in postcommunist CEE where policy has usually been made through inter-party coalition bargaining under sometimes powerful international and EU conditionalities. For similar reasons, we reject office-holding as a measure of party success. Not only is retention of office partly conditioned by policy performance and inter-party negotiation, but the relatively short period during which CEE party systems have existed makes it difficult to identify and aggregate out electoral cycles. Moreover, there has been a tendency among electorates in the region to reject incumbent parties of all political shades after one or two terms in office (Williams 2002; Tavits, 2008) .
This leaves measures based on electoral support. However, although not uninformative, measures of party success such as vote share or absolute numbers of votes received are, in our view, too crude even if averaged across a decade and a half of party competition. As well as overlooking the possible impact of varying institutional arrangements, they ignore the different nature of a large, and perhaps transitory, centre-right vote fragmented between many parties and a concentrated and sustained centre-right vote. Raw measures of centre-right parliamentary representation, although again relevant, suffer from similar flaws. For the purposes of this paper we therefore choose a definition of party 'success' based on two elements:
(a) 'breadth', by which we mean the ability to construct an inclusive electoral entity that encompasses a socially and ideologically broad range of voters and sub-groups;
and (b) 'durability', which we take to mean the ability of such an entity to remain united and endure.
In our view organizational success is an important component shaping electoral success and we would argue that broad and durable party-type formations are more likely to be electorally successful. Larger parties have a clear advantage within majoritarian electoral systems, where both 'psychological' and 'mechanical' factors favour them (Duverger 1954: 216-228) . However, even under the list-based systems of proportional representation that predominate in CEE, similar effects operate through, for example, registration requirements that favour larger parties; minimum thresholds for securing parliamentary representation; de facto thresholds caused by districting effects; commonly used formulae for translating votes into seats; and 'topup' lists of reserved seats for parties securing a particular share of the vote. While a wider range of smaller parties might be able to target specific ideological or socioeconomic segments more effectively, broad and inclusive formations reduce information costs for voters and, once formed, avoid or minimise transaction costs involved in negotiating and maintaining pre-electoral alliances and post-election coalition agreements as they require fewer partners and can negotiate from a position of strength. Durable party formations avoid the repeated start-up costs associated with the programmatic and organizational development of new parties and are also more likely to attract talented elites interested in joining electorally successful, officeholding parties with long-term prospects.
Overview of cases
Although we believe meaningful definitions of the CEE centre-right can be formulated (Hanley 2004: 10-16) , in this paper we identify right-wing and centre-right In the first two post-communist elections, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)
was the largest centre-right party but was only moderately successful in terms of breadth, garnering 58% of the total centre-right and right-wing vote in 1990 and 32% in 1994. From the mid-1990s, it was eclipsed by Fidesz which, as Democratic Left Alliance. Finally, the agrarian Self-Defence party, which some commentators categorise as a right-wing or radical right party (Minkenberg 2002: 351) , was also excluded. While there were clearly nationalist-populist elements in Self-Defence's programme and discourse, the party's primary appeal was an economically populist one.
The first fully free Polish parliamentary election held in October 1991 produced an atomized parliament including a fragmented centre-right and right. As Table 1 
The limits of previous approaches
For a number of reasons, widely used macro-institutional and historical-structural explanations of party development have limited power to explain the variance we observe across our three cases.
Macro-institutional approaches
Macro-institutional approaches to explaining the relative strength and durability of centre-right formations in post-communist CEE tend to focus on two variables: the electoral system, particularly its degree of proportionality; and the nature of executive structures, particularly the presence or absence of a strong presidency.
Electoral systems
Arguments that the 'mechanical' and 'psychological' effects of majoritarian and proportional electoral systems tend to produce two-party and multi-party systems respectively have a long lineage in political science (Duverger 1954: 216-228) . In the context of our research more majoritarian electoral systems should produce stronger and more cohesive centre-right parties. However, close examination of our three CEE cases suggests problems with this argument at both the empirical and theoretical level.
Firstly, Hungary is the only one of the cases considered here that has a predominantly majoritarian rather than proportional electoral system. Given the relative consolidation and cohesion of Hungary's centre-right, the nature of the country's electoral system offers a superficially plausible explanatory account, particularly if
Hungary is considered in a binary comparison with the Polish case. However, while less proportional than that of other CEE states, Hungary's electoral system is a 'mixed' model with three interlinking majoritarian and proportional tiers which offer a complex mix of incentives and choices to both large and small parties seeking to formulate alliance building and campaigning strategies (Birch, Millard, Popescu and Williams 2002: 63-6) . Moreover, far from shaping a party system forming ex nihilo in the early 1990s, the election system agreed by regime and opposition in 1989 in
Hungary was shaped by well profiled emergent political parties that had existed under late communism, including both the Hungarian Democratic Forum and Fidesz. Moreover, while the Czech and Polish electoral systems differ in some respects, and both have undergone significant amendment over the last fifteen years, they are broadly similar in terms of their proportionality (Birch et al 2002: 41-5) . Nevertheless,
as Tables 2 and 3 show, they have produced substantially different outcomes, with the Czech centre-right considerably more stable and consolidated than the Polish one.
The Czech electoral system's relatively low barriers to entry did not produce the complex patterns of fragmentation, re-alignment and re-fragmentation characteristic of the Polish right in the period.
Secondly, a single electoral system may co-exist with varying patterns of party organisational success in the same country. In the Polish case, for example, the explanatory power of an electoral system-based approach is undermined by the differences between the communist successor left and the centre-right in the 1990s.
While both have had to operate with the same set of institutional incentives the former was, until recently at least, able to develop relative organisational coherence and consolidation compared with the latter.
Thirdly, given that it is political and party forming elites that are themselves responsible for drafting electoral laws, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish cause election to register as a coalition, not a party, thereby raising its own electoral threshold from 5% to 8%, were not committed by the principal centre-right groupings in Hungary or the Czech Republic.
Semi-presidentialism
Another influential set of macro-institutional explanations of party development centre on the proposition that a parliamentary regime is more likely to produce strong parties, in this case a cohesive centre-right bloc, than a presidential or semipresidential system. For example, in a paired comparison of the Czech Republic and Poland, Saxonberg argues that the presence of a well-institutionalised party on the Czech centre-right derived, in part, from an indirectly elected presidency and concomitant absence of incentives for charismatic leaders to pursue alternatives to party formation (Saxonberg 2003: 2-36 into a more conventional party-like grouping was necessary and unavoidable (Hanley 2007: 66-90) . This suggests that the cognitive frameworks through which new political elites approach post-transition politics can be a critical intervening variable in explaining (un)successful party development. contrasting. Indeed, as discussed above, the success of the Hungarian centre-right seems more closely to parallel that in the Czech Republic, whose historical pathway through communism to competitive politics after 1989 was wholly different.
Path dependency and critical junctures
Notions of 'path dependence' appear to offer a solution to some of the limitations of legacy approaches, which overlook the autonomy of political dynamics and the speed with which they can erode legacy-determined patterns of initial competition. Theorists of path dependence argue that many durable, established political patterns across national cases are 'locked in' by actors' choices at key formative moments of uncertainty or 'critical junctures' (North 1990 , Collier and Collier 1991 , Mahoney 2000 and Pierson 2004 ). The formation of parties and party systems in new democracies, and thus the greater stability and success of some centre-right formations in CEE, can be viewed as such a path dependent process (Lipset and Rokkan 1967 , Thelen 1999 , Pierson 2004 ).
In her work on communist successor parties, Grzymała-Busse, for example, adapts the structural-historical regime legacies framework of Kitschelt and his collaborators, arguing that organisational and programmatic choices made by reform-minded elites in communist successor parties during the critical juncture following the transition from communism of 1989-91 played a decisive role in determining their future development.
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A similar framework of path dependency and post-transition critical junctures could be constructed to explain diversity and varying success on the CEE centre-right.
Moderate centre-right parties in CEE are, after all, typically the 'successor parties' of opposition movements, rather than tabula rasa creations. In Poland, almost all centreright groupings of the 1990s were descendants of the Solidarity movement, the most successful of them (Solidarity Electoral Action) quite explicitly so (Wenzel 1998 Mass organisation in post-communist Europe has, with a few exceptions, proved costly and ineffective; social constituencies in the region are often ill defined; and partisan identification has been weak and slow to develop in societies with limited civic engagement and high levels of cynicism about parties, politicians and politics.
State funding, which is an increasingly dominant source of party resources, sustains a party only so long as it enjoys (and usually in proportion to its) electoral success, and offers immediate resources to political newcomers. Although these factors also partially serve as a barrier to new party formation, they raise doubts as to the extent to which outcomes, such as relative success or failure, might have been 'locked in' in the aftermath of supposed critical junctures.
Any notion that centre-right party success in the cases under review was 'locked in' through a critical juncture process would, therefore, seem misplaced. Our cases suggest that the 'lock in' of party success is confined to the fact that start-up costs make it difficult for challenger parties to emerge while existing formations control the bulk of available resources and attract (limited) partisan identification. Party success in these cases may thus be a relatively brittle phenomenon requiring sustained, active maintenance on the part of party elites. Simply put, it is wrong to label any election bringing significant but temporary change to a party system a 'critical juncture'
Other explanations of CEE centre-right success

Elite cohesion and successful party formation
Many studies have noted party elites' importance as powerful autonomous actors shaping party formation in post-communist CEE (Szczerbiak 2001; van Biezen 2003) .
Others have seen them more as bearers of resources generated during the communist period. Grzymała-Busse (2002), for example, argues that variation in the communist successor parties' political appeals is explained by the contrasting 'usable pasts' which successor party elites bought to post-1989 politics, by which she means both accumulated legitimacy and specific 'portable skills'.
Our work on centre-right parties suggests that other forms of elite endowment can matter more. In our cases, we find no clear variation in either the degree of elite or parliamentary domination during party formation. In its original incarnation Fidesz was formed 'externally' on the basis of a small-scale student protest movement of the We also do not find significant differences in the skills or 'usable pasts' of partyfounding elites capable of explaining the variation we detect. For mass publics after 1989 in all three cases right-wing party-founding elites were credible opponents of the old regime or 'new faces' untainted by collaboration with it. However, the ex- ideologically, but also in geographical, generational and professional terms (Friszke 1990 ). Thus even a distinct group such as Polish (neo-)liberal intellectuals, who shared a common ideology marking them out from Catholic nationalists or workingclass trade union activists, were fragmented into sub-groups based around different localities, leading personalities and agendas (Szacki 1995) . Equivalent Hungarian and Czech elites were numerically, geographically and ideologically more compact. In contrast to the cases of Fidesz and the Czech Civic Democrats, no dominant cohesive founding elite emerged as the core of the centre-right in Poland. Those broad electoral coalitions that did form and briefly seemed capable of durably uniting the diverse elements of the right, such as the bloc supporting Wałęsa's 1990 presidential bid or Solidarity Electoral Action, floundered because they were in essence also elite coalitions with no dominant cohesive core elite.
Ideological crafting
A further important (but neglected) element in determining the emergence of inclusive, stable centre-right party formations across the region is, we believe, the crafting of durable political ideologies for the post-communist right. Ideology plays a crucial role in framing political action, giving cohesion and identity to political organisations and socializing incoming elites. In the context of CEE centre-right party development, this entailed formulating an integrative ideological narrative that could unite older 'historic' discourses of conservatism, nationalism and populism; anticommunism; and ideas imported from Western contexts or developed locally in the context of post-communist social and economic transformation. In the short term, it is true, a charismatic leader can hold together a diverse and heterogeneous formation, acting as a substitute for ideology or a common narrative. The charismatic leadership of Orbán and Klaus clearly was important in the early stages of centre-right party development in Hungary and the Czech Republic; and the lack of it a key weakness in the case of sustaining Solidarity Electoral Action. However, in the absence of elite cohesion and ideological integration, charismatic leadership provides only a shortterm breathing space for emergent centre-right groupings to develop an integrative ideological narrative that can provide a sustainable basis to develop a broad and durable political formation. Politicians in early post-communist politics could, therefore, be seen not only as political entrepreneurs, but also as ideological entrepreneurs.
In the Czech context, a key element of the Civic Democratic Party's success lay in its leaders' ability to frame a new ideological discourse of 'rightness' which imported Anglo-American New Right ideas, grounded them in a Czech post-communist context and related them to the delivery of a programme of post-communist socio-economic transformation. The exhaustion of the original ideological 'project', with the waning of the big issues associated with post-communist transformation, and the fracturing of the neo-liberal elite that formed the core of its 'dominant coalition' (Panebianco 1988) after the Civic Democrats lost office in 1997, may have prevented them from achieving the kind of hegemony on the centre-right enjoyed by Fidesz in Hungary.
Nonetheless, the 'project' provided a unifying narrative during the party's key formative period and gave it enough early organisational coherence to both prevent significant fragmentation following electoral defeat and engage in subsequent ideological renewal.
In contrast to the Czech centre-right, Hungary's Fidesz came to reject neo-liberal economics, which it saw as serving the interests of Hungary's ex-nomenklatura elite and its foreign sponsors. However, Fidesz's success and cohesion at both mass-electoral and elite-intellectual levels too appeared partly rooted in its leaders' ability to More recently, however, it seems self-consciously to have functioned more as a 'catch-all' party of opposition to conservative nationalism, downplaying its economic liberalism to 'borrow' many potential centre-left voters prepared to vote for it as the most effective way of removing the conservative Law and Justice-led government (Szczerbiak 2005 (Szczerbiak , 2007 .
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered why some centre-right party formations in CEE have been consistently more successful than others during the decade-and-a-half of competitive electoral politics that followed the fall of communism. We defined a 'successful' centre-right party formation as one which comprised an inclusive electoral entity encompassing a socially and ideologically broad range of voters and sub-groups; and remained stable and cohesive over time. Having operationalized this dependent variable through a range of measures we ranked Hungary first (high breadth, medium durability), the Czech Republic (medium breadth, high durability) as the second most successful case, and Poland (low breadth and durability) as the least successful. We found that both macro-institutional explanations, focusing on executive structures and electoral systems, and historical-structural explanations stressing communist regime legacies had limited power to explain the observed variance. The introduction of a more sophisticated framework of path dependence, stressing the role of choices and political crafting at critical junctures, seemed to offer a plausible resolution. However, the lack of strong 'lock-in' mechanisms required by such approaches makes such a model unconvincing when applied to CEE centre-right party development.
Given these paper, we believe that our work will also prove useful for scholars re-examining this area in the more fluid, less legacy-bound conditions that seem to be emerging in the region. of Czechoslovakia, we use voting figures for elections to the Czech national parliament, the Czech National Council (CNC). In Hungary, which uses a mixed listand single-member constituency system, we take the list vote as our measure.
3 Although measures of fractionalization such as the Rae index are usually applied as a measure of party system fragmentation, there is, in principle, no reason why they cannot be applied to a bloc or tendance within a national party system. Our use of this measure, naturally, does not capture the cohesion of centre-right formations' parliamentary groups once elected. 4 The Christian and Democratic Union is a full member of the EPP; the Civic Democratic Party is a member of the European Democratic Union (EDU) and the European Democrats (ED) sub-grouping that sits with the EPP group in the European Parliament. The Civic Democratic Alliance was an EDU member but following its effective disintegration in 1998 has recently joined the European Liberal Democrat and Reform (ELDR) grouping.
5 Despite a convincing electoral victory, at 58%, Civic Platform's share of the total vote for the right was in fact slightly less than that of Solidarity Electoral Action in 6 In 1989 Hungary's independent proto-parties were (sometime uncomfortably) united in a single negotiating bloc, the so-called Opposition Roundtable, to deal with regime negotiators at the roundtable negotiations proper.
7 Like the more macro-level legacy account developed by Kitschelt et al (1999) , such analyses focus primarily on explaining patterns of national variation in early postcommunist politics and elucidating mechanisms linking past (structural) causes to such initial outcomes. However, although they accept that the determining effect of legacies will ultimately fade there is, once again, an unexplored implication that initial, legacy-shaped outcomes will tend to be durable and thus that those parties initially emerging as strong and successful players will maintain this success. See, for example Grzymała-Busse (2002: 284) .
